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I. INTRODUCTION 
Questions regarding rights permeate family law, just as they do 
other areas of the law.  In teaching family law, one addresses 
parents’ rights to custody and parenting time, grandparents’ rights 
to visitation with their grandchildren, the rights of third-party 
custodians, and, of course, the very right of the state to interfere 
with family affairs in the first place.  But a sub-text in all these 
discussions is the question of whose rights are being considered 
and to what extent, if at all, we can or should consider children1 as 
having meaningful rights.2  If we do agree that there is such a thing 
                                                          
       †   Adjunct Professor, William Mitchell College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.  
Thanks to my volunteer research assistants, Christina Phillippi and Anne Rucker 
for their invaluable help.  I am also grateful to Associate Professor Nancy ver 
Steegh for her comments on a draft of this article. 
 1. I will use the term “children” rather than “minors” in this article.  For 
child-protection purposes, the two can mean the same thing.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 
§ 260C.007, subdiv. 4 (2006) (“[c]hild” means an individual under 18 years of 
age); § 260C.007, subdiv. 23 (“[m]inor” means an individual under 18 years of 
age).   But in paternity matters, for instance, a child is not necessarily a minor.       
§ 257.60.  And more importantly, the term “children’s rights” is far more 
commonly used by commentators. 
 2. For the purposes of this article, I am assuming that for a right to be 
meaningful, it has to be either enforceable or, at least, capable of being enforced. 
1
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as children’s rights, then to what extent does the concept have any 
content?  This question arises particularly when we consider “hard” 
cases such as DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services3 that involve children’s rights or lack of them.  Additionally, 
the matter is complicated because the very term “children’s rights” 
is both broad and loose4 and because the notion of children’s 
rights has been viewed as threatening to society.5  Some have also 
feared that focusing on children’s rights may be harmful to the 
long-term interests of children themselves.6  Moreover, children’s 
rights advocates have conceived of children’s rights in different 
ways,7 but seemingly without devising a concept that has been 
either philosophically or politically persuasive.8  This may be 
because various rights principles have been created in the adult 
world9 and do not work well when applied to children.  
Nevertheless, if we conceive of children as having the capacity to 
develop into autonomous citizens, it should be possible for our 
legal system to foster that development in areas, such as family law, 
where children have important and fundamental interests. 
Part II of this article considers the historical development of 
children’s rights from antiquity through more recent international 
human rights instruments.  Part III looks at several different 
approaches to the concept of children’s rights and focuses on the 
presupposition that children can or should be able to act 
autonomously.  Part IV considers the application of children’s 
rights and autonomy in the specific context of legal standing.  
                                                          
 3. 489 U.S. 189 (1989), discussed further infra Part III. 
 4. Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between Children’s Rights and Civil 
Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 152 (2004). 
 5. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children’s Rights in Judicial 
Custody and Visitation, 36 FAM. L.Q. 105, 107 (2002). 
 6. Bruce C. Hafen, Children’s Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some 
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their “Rights,” in CHILD LAW 113, 115 (Harry 
D. Krause ed., 1992). 
 7. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking Ahead: An Empowerment 
Perspective on the Rights of Children, 68 TEMPLE L. REV. 1585 (1995) (criticizing 
concepts of children’s rights grounded in will theory and interest theory and 
proposing an empowerment theory of children’s rights).  See also Michael S. Wald, 
Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 260–81 (1979) 
(discussing different types of claims under the rubric of children’s rights). 
 8. Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children’s Rights, 80 MINN. L. REV. 
267 (1995).  For Minow, at least by the 1980s, “the movement for children’s rights 
had failed to secure a coherent political or intellectual foundation, not to mention 
a viable constituency with political clout.”  Id. at 287.  This does not seem to have 
changed in subsequent years. 
 9. See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 114–15. 
2
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Finally, Part V concludes that grounding concepts of children’s 
rights on the basis of autonomy alone is inadequate; considers that 
meaningful children’s rights might best be understood in a much 
broader human rights context; and suggests that a form of 
graduated standing for children consistent with children’s 
developing capacities for acting autonomously may be appropriate 
in certain family law cases, particularly in cases involving domestic 
violence where children’s interests may be opposed to at least one 
of their parents. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
A. Antiquity 
At least according to early historians, children’s rights and 
duties were unknown among uncivilized people.10  Far from being 
considered autonomous beings, children were originally regarded 
as a species of property.  In classical Athens, the father of the family 
had the right to decide whether to keep a new-born baby or to 
expose it.11  Although an Athenian father did not have the right to 
put his child to death, abandoning a child did not count as 
homicide.12  Moreover, children could be sold into slavery13 and 
parents were under no legal obligation to raise children.14  
Children born to an unmarried woman were not even considered 
to be citizens.15  As a general rule, children and women could not 
be expected to act autonomously and men were responsible for 
controlling and protecting them.16  Though not owed any 
particular rights, children were obliged to honor parents and, if 
necessary, to support them.17   
                                                          
 10. See generally, SAMUEL M. DAVIS & MORTIMER J. SCHWARTZ, CHILDREN’S 
RIGHTS AND THE LAW 8 (1987). 
 11. A DICTIONARY OF ANCIENT GREEK CIVILIZATION 105 (Methuen 1970).  By 
contrast, in Sparta it was essentially the state making the equivalent decision.  Id. 
 12. DOUGLAS M. MACDOUGALL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 91 (1978). 
 13. Id. at 80.  For instance, daughters traditionally could be sold into slavery 
for engaging in premarital sex though, as MacDougall notes, it seems unlikely that 
Athenian fathers sold even their naughtiest daughters in the fourth and fifth 
centuries.  Id. 
 14. Id. at 91. 
 15. Alberto Maffi, Family and Property Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
ANCIENT GREEK LAW, 255 (Michael Gagarin & David Cohen eds., 2005). 
 16. MACDOUGALL, supra note 12, at 84. 
 17. Maffi, supra note 15, at 255.  See also MACDOUGALL, supra note 12, at 91.  
Under a law attributed to Solon, a son was liable to prosecution for maltreating his 
parents if: he failed to provide food or housing to his parents or grandparents, he 
3
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Similar duties of respect and support appear to have existed in 
other ancient societies.18  Under Roman law, a father had absolute 
power, patria potestas,19 over his children.20  The scope and extent of 
paternal power changed over the centuries, and under later law, a 
father’s power could be taken away if he abandoned a child or 
prostituted a daughter.21  Nevertheless, the power of life and death 
was not formally abolished until Constantine, and it is unlikely that 
child abandonment was forbidden by law until 374.22  After 
Constantine, the law began to take greater notice of children,23 
though the notice that the law took was not always very protective.24  
But having said this, it is possible to make too much of what seems 
to modern eyes to be a cavalier disregard of children.  There can 
be little doubt that parents loved their children in ancient times, 
and childhood, at least for males,25 was a period during which 
future citizens were trained and educated.  Indeed, from classical 
times through the time of Blackstone’s commentaries, there has 
been at least a sense that fathers owed obligations to provide 
maintenance, protection, and education to their children.26  But 
for the most part, these were moral obligations; there were no 
corresponding legal rights that children qua children could assert 
                                                                                                                                  
used violence against them, or he failed to provide proper funeral rites when they 
died.  Id.  But the duty to support was excused if the father had failed to teach him 
a trade, had prostituted him, or he was illegitimate—under those circumstances, 
the theory was that the father was at fault.  Id. at 92. 
 18. See, e.g., RUSS VERSTEGG, EARLY MESOPOTAMIAN LAW 94 (2000); RUSS 
VERSTEGG, LAW IN ANCIENT EGYPT 135 (2002); DAVIS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 
8–9. 
 19. Patria potestas included the power of life and death, the power of sale, the 
power to give children in marriage and divorce them at pleasure, and the right to 
give them in adoption and emancipate them at pleasure.  R. W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS 
OF ROMAN LAW 60–61 (4th ed. 1956). 
 20. WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW AND THEIR RELATION 
TO MODERN LAW 241 (W. M. Grant & Sons 1989).  While the Romans believed they 
originated the doctrine of paternal power, it has been observed in a number of 
pre-Roman societies.  Id. at 254. 
 21. Id. at 260. 
 22. LEE, supra note 19, at 61.  Constantine also permitted sale of new-born 
children, though Justinian allowed it only in cases of extreme poverty.  Id. 
 23. This was true at least in the case of natural children; illegitimate children 
were in quite a different position and generally were unable to inherit or even to 
have the opportunity to be legitimized.  JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND 
CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 103 (1987) 
 24. Id. 
 25. But see DAVIS & SCHWARTZ, supra note 10, at 10 (suggesting that in Roman 
times, elder daughters were entitled to an education as were their male 
counterparts). 
 26. See generally id. at 7–21. 
4
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against either their parents or the state. 27 
B. Medieval and Pre-Reformation 
The medieval view of children may have begun to diverge from 
that prevailing during the classical period, though little survives 
about adult attitudes toward children during the Anglo-Saxon 
period from 500 to 1066.28  Evidence from burials does show that 
children were often buried with grave-goods, like adults, and that 
children with deformities were cared for and enabled to grow up.29  
But these may be exceptional cases, for “[o]f all the characteristics 
in which the medieval age differs from the modern, none is so 
striking as the comparative absence of interest in children.”30  
There are echoes of earlier ages in a tendency to leave babies and 
young children to survive or die without great concern in their first 
five or six years.31  Nonetheless, medieval parents appear to have 
been sufficiently concerned to preserve and nurture children into 
productive adulthood32 and it has been suggested that the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries evidenced a new preoccupation with the 
experiences of childhood.33  But during what came to be known as 
the Middle Ages, there is little reason to believe that children were 
                                                          
 27. But see BRUNDAGE, supra  note 24, at 480.  Brundage notes that evidence 
from court records suggests that support orders for minor children were small, but 
despite this, “judges had to intervene with both moral suasion and penal sanctions 
in order to secure payments as ordered.”  Id.  Over 700 years later, perhaps the 
only comment needed is plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. 
 28. Nicholas Orme, Childhood in Medieval England, in REPRESENTING 
CHILDHOOD, http://www.pitt.edu/AFShome/d/c/dch29/public/html/gubar/ 
medieval_child.htm. 
 29. Id.  But see B. J. Peens & D. A. Louw, Children’s Rights: A Review, 19 MED. & 
L. 31, 32–33 (2000).  Peens and Louw refer to a number of studies that highlight 
the worthlessness of children before the sixteenth century with children over the 
age of six being considered small adults who had to participate in adult work.  Id.  
No doubt childhood was short and, no doubt, not as pleasant as it could be by 
modern standards, but it seems somewhat contradictory to argue that children 
were both property and essentially worthless. 
 30. BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR 49 (1978).  Tuchman notes that 
in literature, for example, “the chief role of children was to die, usually drowned, 
smothered, or abandoned in a forest on the orders of some king fearing prophecy 
or mad husband testing a wife’s endurance.”  Id. 
 31. Id. at 52. 
 32. BARBARA A. HANAWALT, OF GOOD AND ILL REPUTE:  GENDER AND SOCIAL 
CONTROL IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 174 (1998).  In particular, Hanawalt notes the 
importance of the whole community, rather than just individual families, in 
children’s lives.  Id. at 158–75.  See also TUCHMAN, supra note 30, at 52 (noting that 
children had toys and that “[l]ittle boys were like little boys of any time . . . .”). 
 33. HANAWALT, supra note 32, at 194 n.1. 
5
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excluded from the feudal social structure in which relationships 
were ordered and based on a hierarchy of duty and obedience.34  As 
one might expect, the thread of this relationship structure that 
posited children’s duties (without any sense of corresponding 
rights) has been very persistent.35 
C. Post-Reformation 
The importance of status and a hierarchy of authority based 
on duty and obedience perhaps explains what otherwise seems as 
an anomaly regarding children’s rights.  That is, in post-
Reformation England, children often occupied positions of great 
power.36  The explanation for this may be that prevailing notions 
regarding duty and obedience did not particularly distinguish 
between children and adults.37  Rather than being about children, 
the point was to reinforce status relationships.38  But the weight of 
political and social reform that began in England in the late 
sixteenth century was transported to the American colonies and 
shifted the justification of authority from status to consent.  
Because of the widespread belief that children were immature and 
incapable of looking after themselves physically, mentally, and 
emotionally, children were viewed as being unable to consent.39  
Thus, childhood became a distinct legal status because children 
were perceived as lacking the ability to form their own judgments.40 
                                                          
 34. HOLLY BREWER, BY BIRTH OR CONSENT:  CHILDREN, LAW, AND THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN AUTHORITY 103 (2005).  But Brewer also notes that feudal 
rules, such as primogeniture, gave great power to the very young.  Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Miller v. Monson, 228 Minn. 400, 401–02, 37 N.W.2d 543, 544–45 
(1949) (stating that child has a duty to render obedience and services to the 
parent). 
 36. BREWER, supra note 34, at 26–29. 
 37. Id. at 29. 
 38. Id. 
 39. The influence of thinkers such as Locke and Mill is frequently noted in 
this respect.  For Locke, parents had a duty to take care of their offspring “during 
the imperfect state of childhood . . . [and to] govern the actions of their yet 
ignorant nonage, till reason shall take its place and ease them of that trouble . . . .” 
JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil 
Government, in MAN AND THE STATE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 89 (Saxe 
Commins & Robert N. Linscott, eds., 1947). Similarly, Mill excluded children from 
his principle of liberty because they were not “in the maturity of their faculties . . . 
[and] must be protected against their own actions as well as against external 
injury.”  JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY, AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 73 (Everyman’s Library ed., J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 
1940) (1859). 
 40. BREWER, supra note 34, at 7. 
6
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D. Modern Approaches 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a nascent 
children’s rights movement opposed the view that children were 
primarily quasi-property and economic assets.  Indeed, as economic 
assets, children were probably little better off than animals and it 
was not until scandals such as the “Mary Ellen Affair” that 
organizations devoted to child protection began to emerge. 41  That 
organized child protection should arise so late is not so surprising 
when one considers that nineteenth-century courts were generally 
loath to interfere in matters of family government.42  Courts were 
guided by a tradition of individual autonomy that kept the 
government out of purely family affairs, thereby limiting the 
government’s role in protecting children.43  By contrast, the 
Progressive movement, which continued into the early part of the 
twentieth century, focused on broad child welfare reforms as being 
integral to development of a more humane society.44 For the 
reformers, children’s rights grew out of their dependency and 
capacity for growth.45  Therefore, for Progressives, it was essential 
for society to protect children from abuse, even where the abusers 
were their parents,46 and to pass laws regulating child labor and 
                                                          
 41. In 1874, a New York court ordered that ten-year-old Mary Ellen Wilson be 
removed from the abusive home of her putative biological father’s widow.  Mary 
Ellen’s plight came to light largely through the efforts of Henry Bergh, then 
president of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals.  
Subsequent publicity directly led to the American Society for the Prevention of 
Cruelty to Children being established.  See American Humane: Who We Are: Mary 
Ellen Wilson, http://www.americanhumane.org/site/PageServer?pagename=wh_ 
mission_maryellen (last visited March 24, 2007).  Interestingly, despite its original 
intention to prevent child abuse, the Society initially dealt primarily with poverty, 
not abuse.  Andrea Charlow, Race, Poverty, and Neglect, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
763, 764 (2001).  But see Appell, supra note 4, at 158 (noting that protecting 
children did not include protecting enslaved or newly freed children). 
 42. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. (Phil.) 453 (1868). 
 43. Elizabeth Bartholet, The Challenge of Children’s Rights Advocacy: Problems and 
Progress in the Area of Child Abuse and Neglect, 3 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 
215, 217 (2004). 
 44. MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 1 (2005). 
 45. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse & Sarah Rebecca Katz, Martyrs, the Media and 
the Web: Examining Grassroots Children’s Rights Movement Through the Lens of Social 
Movement Theory, 5 WHITTIER J. OF CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 121, 125 (2005). 
 46. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 2.  As Guggenheim also points out, these 
advances were strongly resisted.  As late as 1924, the President of Columbia 
University condemned proposed child labor laws because “they would empower 
Congress to invade the rights of parents and to shape family life to its liking.”  Id. 
at 3. 
7
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providing for compulsory education.47  Despite setbacks,48 the 
Progressive movement was ultimately successful in raising 
awareness of children’s issues and, significantly, in the 
establishment of the juvenile court system.49 
The most recent burst of enthusiasm for children’s rights arose 
in the 1960s and 1970s and was strongly influenced by 
commentators who viewed children as victims of discrimination50 or 
as an oppressed group in need of liberation.51  As such, children 
were seen to be in essentially the same position as racial minorities 
or women.52 This conception of children’s rights identified state 
interference as preventing children from being autonomous 
beings.53  Ironically, according to this view, the advances gained by 
the Progressive movement worked against children who were now 
enmeshed in a system that denied them autonomy and personal 
freedom.54  For children’s rights advocates, this problem may arise 
because the focus is on children’s interests and in protecting them 
from themselves and others.55  Thus, grounding children’s rights in 
dependency on others merely reaffirms children’s vulnerability and 
helplessness.56 
By contrast, advocates may focus on liberty rights as a basis for 
children’s rights57 and advance rights claims based on a child’s 
individual personhood.58  Of course, this approach comes closer 
than the dependency view to holding a child to be an autonomous 
                                                          
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (declaring federal laws 
regulating child labor to be unconstitutional). 
 49. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 4. 
 50. RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 1 (1974). 
 51. See JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD 26–29 (1974). 
 52. Appell, supra note 4, at 153. 
 53. Id. 
 54. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 6. 
 55. See, e.g., Federle, supra note 7, at 1590.  Federle argues that by linking 
“rights-generating interests to children’s incapacities, interest theorists suggest that 
children are incapable of caring for themselves.”  Id.  See also, Appell, supra note 4, 
at 166–71.  Appell criticizes dependency rights as being “no more than a question 
of competing adult values, in which dominant values—those appreciated by the 
state—are likely to prevail.”  Id. at 171. 
 56. Appell, supra note 4, at 171. 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 154–55 for an outline of what Appell calls “quasi-civil 
rights.”  See also Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 114 n.33 (noting that the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized children’s rights in many different settings, from 
education to juvenile justice). 
 58. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 13.  For Guggenheim, this is a fatally 
flawed premise because it runs the risk of “isolating children from the larger fabric 
of society into which they have been born and are being raised.”  Id. 
8
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individual with his or her own personal rights, rather than being 
the property of either the parents or the state.59  Recognizing that 
children have individual personhood entails recognizing that 
children are not merely extensions of their parents with the 
capacity to develop into autonomous actors, if not necessarily 
having the present capacity to act autonomously. 
E. International Context 
The growth of children’s rights in international and 
transnational law has been identified as a striking change in the 
post-war legal landscape.60  The principles enumerated by the 1959 
United Nations’ Declaration of the Rights of the Child (UNDRC) 
included children’s rights in the rubric of fundamental human 
rights and focused on children’s rights as arising from their 
dependency needs, rather than as being autonomous, individual 
rights.61  For instance, Principle 6 of the UNDRC provided for the 
full and harmonious development of children’s personalities 
through love and understanding, through growing up in the care 
and under the responsibility of parents, and “in any case, in an 
atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security.”62  
Moreover, the UNDRC identified the best interests of the child as 
the paramount consideration for States in enacting laws to promote 
child development.63 
Subsequently, the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC)64 set forth a broad range of dependency, 
autonomy, and equality rights.65  Some of the rights in the CRC 
remain merely aspirational, but a more significant problem may be 
that there is an internal conflict between individual autonomy 
enjoyed by the child and the role of the family, in particular the 
authority enjoyed by parents, in relation to children.66  It has now 
                                                          
 59. See Jamie D. Manasco, Parent-Child Relationships: The Impetus Behind the 
Gregory K. Decision, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 243, 258 (1993). 
 60. Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 108. 
 61. Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), at pmbl. 14 
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16 at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959). 
 62. Id. at princ. 6. 
 63. Id. at princ. 2.  Notwithstanding the inclusion of the best interests 
standard, the UNDRC also endorsed the tender years doctrine.  See id. at princ. 6. 
 64. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, ¶ 44 U.N. 
GAOR. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/736 (Nov. 28, 1989). 
 65. See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 109. 
 66. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 64, art. 14.  Paragraph 1 of Article 14 
provides that “States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of 
9
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become something of a truism that the United States remains the 
only nation not to have ratified the CRC.  While this may not have 
anything to do with children’s rights,67 it is, nevertheless, a 
conspicuous absence. 
III.    AUTONOMY AND THE CONCEPT OF CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 
On one level, it makes little sense to think of children’s rights 
as arising from their status as autonomous individuals.  To suggest 
that a child is autonomous is to suggest that he or she is either self-
governing or capable of existing or functioning independently.68  
This is not always self-evidently true to the extent that children 
exhibit defects of practical rationality.69  That is to say, young 
children in particular cannot tailor their current actions to take 
account of later desires, such as conserving water now for later 
thirst.70  Of course, this is not to say that children do not make, and 
act on, independent decisions.71  Much depends on the child’s age, 
since even the most ardent children’s rights advocate would not 
suggest that a child under five, for example, is capable of acting 
autonomously in the sense that the child, in making a choice, is 
assuming responsibility for all foreseeable consequences.72  Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                  
thought, conscience and religion,” whereas paragraph 2 provides that “States 
Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, 
legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right 
in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”  Id., art. 14, ¶¶ 1, 
2.  This conflict has been noted by an Irish examination of children’s rights law.  
See LAW REFORM COMMITTEE OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND, RIGHTS-BASED CHILD 
LAW: THE CASE FOR REFORM 57–58 (2006), http://www.lawsociety.ie/documents/ 
committees/lawreform/childreport06.pdf.  The report also notes that 
enforcement of the Convention is compromised by the vagueness of its 
language—which makes incorporation into national law difficult—and, perhaps 
more importantly, that there is no enforcement mechanism.  Id.  But see 
Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 109 (“The CRC’s most important role is not in 
articulating claims to be asserted by children in court . . . but is in proposing 
norms of justice to guide those engaged in developing laws and social policies.”). 
 67. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 44, at 15.  Guggenheim suggests that the 
United States’ failure to ratify the CRC does not amount to a repudiation of 
children’s rights.  I think this view underestimates the importance of perception in 
international law. 
 68. See RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 47 (4th ed. 2001). 
 69. See David A. J. Richards, Rights and Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL 203, 
206 (John Christman, ed., 1989). 
 70. Id. 
 71. On a trivial level, even very young children can choose whether to have 
cereal or toast, or both, for breakfast.  But this does not necessarily indicate 
autonomy, as children may not have any say whatsoever in the range of choices. 
 72. Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, in THE INNER CITADEL, supra note 69, at 27, 42. 
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recent research into brain changes in adolescence suggests that the 
frontal areas of the brain responsible for high-level reasoning and 
decision making do not fully mature until adulthood or their early 
twenties.73  Consequently, minor children typically are not 
considered to be fully rational, autonomous individuals.74  Scholars 
have defined autonomy, in this sense, as “the capacities, developed 
or undeveloped, of persons, which enable them to develop, want to 
act on, and act on higher-order plans of action. . . .”75  Additionally, 
at least in the Western tradition of rights, autonomy is part and 
parcel of our bundle of negative rights: the right to pursue our own 
individual ideas of good, to be left alone, and to be free from 
unwarranted state intervention in our lives.76 
On this basis, then, it is somewhat natural to be skeptical of 
negative, autonomy-based rights insofar as such rights are 
attributed to all children qua children.  This is particularly so when 
viewed against the background of the United States Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding negative children’s rights, as 
manifested in DeShaney.77 
In DeShaney, a four-year-old boy, Joshua, was beaten repeatedly 
by his father and suffered serious and permanent brain damage 
despite the fact that the Wisconsin child protection services had 
known of the abuse and had repeatedly failed to take action to 
remove Joshua from harm.78  The case is clearly a “hard” one 
because it involved senseless assaults by a parent on a defenseless 
child.  But just as importantly, however, it highlights the very 
narrow protections offered children by the negative rights granted 
under the Due Process Clause as interpreted by DeShaney.79  It has 
                                                          
 73. Robert S. Boyd, Teenage Trouble? Blame It on Their Brains, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Dec. 19, 2006, at A1.  See generally DAVID WALSH, WHY DO THEY ACT 
THAT WAY 37 (2004).  While beyond the scope of this article, the impact of such 
recent research involving childhood cognitive and emotional development on 
areas of family law and juvenile justice would be a fruitful area for study. 
 74. See Tamar Ezer, A Positive Right to Protection for Children, 7 YALE HUM. RTS. & 
DEV. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2004). 
 75. Richards, supra note 69, at 205. 
 76. See Ezer, supra note 74, at 4. 
 77. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 78. Id. at 192–93.  Joshua’s abuse was well-documented, as was his case-
worker’s chilling remark when told of Joshua’s last beating that “I just knew the 
phone would ring some day and Joshua would be dead.”  Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 79. Id.  at 195 (majority opinion).  The Court drew a sharp distinction 
between public and private action, concluding that there was no constitutional 
right to protection against private violence.  See also Town of Castle Rock v. 
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been noted that the Court could not sustain this purely negative 
constitutional view,80 leaving open the possibility of the State having 
affirmative duties to care for and protect certain individuals,81 and 
that the State may not deny protective services to disfavored 
minorities.82  Nonetheless, the Court refused to accept the notion 
that the government has a duty to protect children even where the 
government is responsible for the child remaining in known 
danger,83 thus supporting the proposition that an autonomy model 
predicated on a right to be free from interference is inadequate for 
children.84 
Despite the differences between children and adults, some 
commentators have categorized children’s rights that presuppose 
children’s autonomy.85  For example, the empowerment 
perspective attributes competencies to children that enable them 
to act autonomously in legal proceedings affecting them.86  This 
view is critical both of interest-based rights and of feminist theories 
of rights that emphasize relationships between individuals and 
reject traditional approaches to rights in which autonomy is 
central.87  But autonomy seems to be necessary to the 
empowerment perspective because it requires that children act 
                                                                                                                                  
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).  In Town of Castle Rock, three children were 
murdered by their father after law enforcement failed to enforce a domestic abuse 
order.  Id. at 754.  The Court held that the benefit to a third party in having 
someone arrested for a crime generally does not trigger Due Process Clause 
protections.  Id. at 768. 
 80. Ezer, supra note 74, at 21. 
 81. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198. 
 82. Id. at 197 n.3. 
 83. See id. at 202. 
 84. See Ezer, supra note 74, at 38.  Ezer argues that a better approach would 
be to ground children’s rights in “positive” freedom based on human dignity and 
children’s development and potential.  This approach emphasizes that “[s]tanding 
alone, neither emphasis on autonomy, dependence, nor development provides a 
complete picture of children’s rights.”  Id. at 41. 
 85. See, e.g., Wald, supra note 7, at 260 (stating four different types of claims 
under children’s rights, vis-à-vis, generalized claims against the world, protection 
from abuse or neglect, the right to be treated equally with adults by the state, and 
the right to act independently of parental control); Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 
114–22 (describing five principles governing rights schemes: equality, individual 
dignity, privacy, protection, and empowerment). 
 86. See Federle, supra note 7, at 1601 (suggesting that adherence to the 
empowerment perspective provides children a crucial voice and bargaining power 
in legal proceedings); see also infra Part IV. 
 87. Federle, supra note 7, at 1591–92.  For Federle, however, tying rights to 
relationships is just another way of saying that children have interests that have to 
be protected because they are incompetent.  Id. 
12
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independently to vindicate their own rights, albeit with competent 
representation to advocate the children’s interests and wishes.88  It 
may well be true that the empowerment perspective separates 
rights from interests, and therefore avoids reaffirming children’s 
vulnerability and helplessness;89 but if these rights are not 
relationship rights,90 then it is unclear where they are grounded 
unless we attribute to children the same negative rights that we 
attribute to adults, thus implying that children are equally capable 
of autonomous, free choices.  But we treat children differently 
precisely because we make assumptions about their incapacity to 
act in an adult manner and thereby try to foster their growth 
toward autonomous citizens.91 
That we do not attribute to children the capacity to make 
autonomous, free choices is perhaps not least because of the 
difficulty of delineating a theory of rights that is appropriate for all 
children at all stages of development.92  Therefore, it may be more 
productive to view autonomy as latent in the sense that it is present 
in all persons, including children, but that the capacity to exercise 
it may be restricted.93  At the same time, the capacity to exercise it 
might also be encouraged.94  The question then becomes how we 
might best do that; it is perhaps in this area that the empowerment 
perspective is of some value.  It may ensure that at least some 
children have a voice in matters that directly affect them and 
tangibly recognize their capacity for autonomy.95  Standing in 
judicial proceedings may be a place to start.  One way to do this 
                                                          
 88. Id. at 1600.  Advocating for children’s interests and children’s wishes need 
not be the same thing, of course.  A guardian ad litem normally advises the court 
on a child’s interests.  An attorney normally must represent her client’s wishes. 
 89. Id. at 1591. 
 90. Children’s rights may not necessarily be relational rights.  See, e.g., Ezer, 
supra note 74, at 1 (noting that the term “child” does not stand alone but 
necessarily implies a relationship). 
 91. Wald, supra note 7, at 266. 
 92. See, e.g., Theresa Glennon & Robert G. Schwartz, Foreword: Looking Back, 
Looking Ahead: The Evolution of Children’s Rights, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1557, 1561 (1995) 
(pointing out that children’s developmental years are continuously changing and 
that one set of rights may not be appropriate for all levels of children). 
 93. Alexander McCall Smith, Is Anything Left of Parental Rights?, in FAMILY 
RIGHTS, 5–6 (Elaine Sutherland & Alexander McCall Smith eds., 1990). 
 94. Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 118–20. 
 95. Leigh Goodmark, From Property to Personhood: What the Legal System Should 
Do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 237, 324–25 (1999).  See 
also Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 118 (stating that empowerment respects 
children’s individuality while within the context of their eventual capacity for 
autonomy). 
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may be to expand the statutory schemes, which permit children to 
have standing and representation in termination of parental rights 
and neglect proceedings, to include proceedings such as those 
involving domestic abuse where children’s interests may be adverse 
to parents and where they do not benefit from statutory rights to 
representation.96  A move in this direction may reflect “graduated 
standing” that takes into account children’s development and their 
capacity to act autonomously. 
IV.   AUTONOMY AND LEGAL STANDING 
An autonomy-based approach to children’s rights suggests that 
it is appropriate to grant standing to children in family law cases 
that can profoundly affect their interests and their lives.  Indeed, 
not only would it be appropriate—it would be necessary to 
vindicate children’s rights that might be opposed to those of their 
parents or others.  For example, children’s interests will be adverse 
to at least one of their parents in family violence cases.97 
Though there may be statutory bases for the permissive joinder 
of children98 and of third parties in custody proceedings,99 standing 
is the right to take the initial steps in framing legal issues ultimately 
to be decided by a court or jury.100  One must have, in an individual 
or representative capacity, a real interest in the cause of action.101  
Thus, standing requires that a party has a sufficient stake in a 
justiciable controversy to seek relief from a court.102  Such a stake 
has been defined as having a substantial, direct, and immediate 
interest in the subject-matter litigation.103 
Read in this way, it makes perfect sense that the child of a 
marriage should be a party as a matter of course to the dissolution 
of that marriage.104  Additionally, from the point of view of 
                                                          
 96. Goodmark, supra note 95, at 319. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 257.60 (2006) (providing for permissive joinder in 
paternity actions). 
 99. E.g., Murray v. Antell, 361 N.W.2d 466, 468–69 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) 
(permitting joinder of stepfather in former husband’s motion to modify custody). 
 100. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004). 
 101. E.g., Presidential Capital Corp. v. Reale, 652 A.2d 489, 504 (Conn. 1994). 
 102. Alliance for Metro. Stability v. Metro. Council, 671 N.W.2d 905, 913 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731–32 
(1972)). 
 103. Frank v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 196 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 104. Indeed, some proponents of children’s rights take such a position.  See, 
e.g., Federle, supra note 7, at 1600–01.  Federle describes the hypothetical cases of 
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children’s autonomy, it would seem to follow that children should 
have standing and be parties as of right to family law proceedings 
that affect their interests.105  It is difficult to argue that children do 
not have a sufficient stake in the outcome of a marriage dissolution 
case that may well determine where the child lives and with 
whom.106  But children are generally not considered to be parties to 
marriage dissolution proceedings.107  This is so even though the 
dissolution binds children to the parts of the dissolution judgment 
that resolve the child-related aspects of the dissolution.108  Children 
are also denied standing in their parents’ custody and visitation 
cases, largely on the theory that at least one of the parents will 
adequately represent the child’s interests.109  As a result, courts 
place children in the same place as adult would-be interveners 
whose personal or family interests do not constitute an “interest” 
sufficient to support intervention as of right.110  Instead of children 
                                                                                                                                  
“Ashley,” who would have the right to participate as a party, which would mean 
more than simply participating in the process.  Id.  “Ashley” would necessarily have 
standing as a party in all divorce proceedings affecting her family.  Id. 
 105. But see Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 119 (noting that state laws and judges 
routinely deny children standing in family law cases). 
 106. Of course, children might be excluded in the sense that they are typically 
not parties to the original marriage contract.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Crockett, 728 
N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (stating the widely held position that marriage 
is a civil contract with three interested parties: the husband, the wife, and the 
State).  But children might be considered to be third-party beneficiaries with 
interests and/or rights that should be protected.  See, e.g., Morelli v. Morelli, 720 
P.2d 704, 706 (Nev. 1986) (holding that a child was a third-party beneficiary of her 
parents’ separation agreement providing for payment of the adult child’s college 
expenses); Drake v. Drake, 455 N.Y.S.2d 420, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (holding 
that children may enforce specific provisions of their parents’ separation 
agreement that are made exclusively for the benefit of the child, such as to 
provide for the child’s educational expenses).  See also Armstrong v. Armstrong, 
544 P.2d 941, 951 (Cal. 1976) (concluding that children were bound by judgment 
in divorce action to which their mother was a party, but conceiving situations 
where parent’s and child’s interests may be opposed). 
 107. See Kielley v. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d 770, 776 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).  See 
also MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 302.04(a) (providing for party designations in various 
family law proceedings and permitting subsequent references to “husband” and 
“wife”). 
 108. Kielley, 674 N.W.2d at 776 n.1. 
 109. E.g., In re Marriage of Thompson, 651 N.E.2d 222 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 110. Van Meveren v. Van Meveren, 603 N.W.2d 671, 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999).  The Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure permit intervention as of right 
where (1) the motion to intervene was timely; (2) there is an interest relating to 
the property or transaction that is the subject of the action; (3) as a practical 
matter, disposition of the action may impair or impede the party’s ability to 
protect that interest; and (4) the party is not adequately represented by the 
existing parties.  MINN. R. CIV. P. 24.01.  But Rule 24.01 has been interpreted to 
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having standing, a court may, or in some cases must, appoint a 
guardian ad litem to represent children’s interests.111  In addition, a 
child over the age of 14 may apply for the appointment of a 
guardian ad litem.112 
Two well-known Florida cases illustrate divergent approaches 
to autonomy and children’s rights to standing in legal proceedings.  
Kingsley adhered to the general rule that children are not entitled 
to bring legal proceedings in their own names.113  In Kingsley, an 
eleven-year-old boy sought to terminate his mother’s parental 
rights by suing in his own name.  Concluding that the district court 
had erred in allowing him to do so, the Florida District Court of 
Appeal held that non-age was a disability that prevented a child 
from initiating such an action.114  Rather, while the child is the real 
party in interest, courts require that an adult of reasonable 
judgment and integrity act for the child as his or her “next 
friend.”115  Thus, as a procedural disability, non-age could be cured 
by appointment of guardian ad litem.116  By contrast, a Florida 
circuit court concluded that Kimberley Mays had standing to sue in 
her own name to sever all ties, including visitation rights, with her 
biological parents.117  Kimberley had been “swapped” at birth with a 
child, Arlena Twigg, who later died.  Blood tests revealed 
Kimberley’s true identity and her biological parents sought to 
establish visitation with her.  After some efforts to do so, the 
relationship broke down and Kimberley sued to sever ties with her 
                                                                                                                                  
preclude intervention as of right in family law situations.  Valentine v. Lutz, 512 
N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1994).  Moreover, a child who wishes to intervene would 
also have to persuade a court that his or her interests are not protected by the 
existing parties, i.e., the parents. 
 111. MINN. STAT. § 518.165, subdivs. 1 and 2 (2006) (providing for permissive 
appointment or, in cases where the court has reason to believe a child is a victim 
of domestic child abuse or neglect, mandatory appointment).  But in both 
situations, appointment of a guardian applies only “where custody or parenting 
time with a minor child is in issue . . . .”  Id.  Therefore, there is no provision for 
appointing a guardian to advise the court on effects of a property settlement, for 
example, on a child’s interests. 
 112. See, e.g., MINN. R. CIV. P. 17.02. 
 113. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 650 (1979)). 
 114. Id. at 783. 
 115. Id. at 784. 
 116. Id.  See also In re Petition of Frazer, 721 A.2d. 920, 921 (Del. 1998) 
(holding the issue of non-age curable by appointing a guardian ad litem). 
 117. Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624, at *3 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Aug. 18, 1993). 
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biological parents.118  The Twigg court concluded that Kimberley 
had standing based on its reading of two separate provisions of the 
Florida Constitution.119 The first provided that children are “natural 
persons” and that minors as well as adults possess constitutional 
rights.120  The second, that “[t]he courts shall be open to every 
person for redress of any injury.”121  Having concluded that 
Kimberley had standing, the court held that it would be 
detrimental to Kimberley to declare her to be the Twigg’s 
biological child.122 
Both the Kingsley and the Twigg cases involved the right of 
children to maintain termination of parental rights actions in their 
own names.123  Although the courts reached different conclusions 
on the standing issue, for the children, the results were the same: 
each achieved termination of their biological parents’ parental 
rights.124  As a result, the question remained as to whether a child 
had status to sue on his or her own behalf to sever parental 
rights.125  The cases could indicate an inclination to address each 
case on its merits, and, though not swinging the courthouse doors 
wide open for children to sue on their own behalf, at least leaving 
them unlocked.126  Perhaps this is so, but since Kingsley and Twigg, 
there has been no great clamoring to open the courthouse doors.  
This may be because courts remain wary of intruding into areas 
traditionally reserved for parental authority even where, for 
standing purposes, a child is within the zone of interests that a 
statute or constitutional guarantee protects.127 
Subsequently, in an unreported decision in Ramos v. Cox, a 
Connecticut court considered a child’s right to challenge a 
paternity judgment in her own name.128  In Ramos, the parents 
acknowledged Cox as Brianna’s father pursuant to Connecticut 
                                                          
 118. Id. at *2. 
 119. Id. at *3. 
 120. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23). 
 121. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21). 
 122. Id. at *6. 
 123. See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780; Twiggs, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624. 
 124. Scott A. Cannon, Finding Their Own “Place to Be”:  What Gregory Kingsley’s 
and Kimberley Mays’ “Divorces” From Their Parents Have Done for Children’s Rights, 39 
LOY. L. REV. 837, 853 (1994). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 855. 
 127. Frank v. Frank, 833 A.2d 194, 197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). 
 128. Ramos v. Cox, No. FA000630917, 2002 WL 31894798, at *1 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 3, 2002). 
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law.129  The parents then resided together and became the parents 
of twin girls.130  Later, Brianna sued to vacate the paternity 
judgment on a number of grounds, including fraud.131  The court 
noted that it would be “peculiar to recognize the interest of the 
child to the determination of parentage and then deny her 
standing in legal proceedings based on or involving that 
determination.”132  Therefore, it concluded that Brianna had 
standing, through her guardian ad litem, to pursue the motion to 
vacate and to be heard on pending motions.133 
By contrast, in Frank v. Frank, three teenage children sought to 
modify a custody order of joint physical custody to sole physical 
custody in their mother, a Christian, following their conversion 
from Judaism.  The father was Jewish.134  Noting that the custody 
issues had already been fully litigated, the court held that the 
mother was seeking to relitigate the trial court’s denial of her 
petition for reconsideration raising the same claims.135  The court 
may well have been correct in this assessment.  But even if the case 
had been an original custody determination rather than a 
modification proceeding, the court would still have held that the 
children lacked standing.136  Pennsylvania law does provide that 
children may express a preference in custody matters,137 as does 
that of most other jurisdictions.138  The child’s preference may be 
expressed through a guardian ad litem or, more commonly, 
through interviews with a court-appointed evaluator.139  But in 
either case, it is the guardian or evaluator who ultimately makes 
recommendations to the court based on her assessment of what is 
                                                          
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at *3. 
 132. Id.  But this notion has not necessarily troubled many courts.  See supra 
note 84 and accompanying text. 
 133. Ramos, 2002 WL 31894798, at *3.  This still leaves open the question of 
whether Brianna could pursue the case in her own name and be represented by an 
attorney as opposed to a guardian.  In any event, Brianna was ultimately unable to 
produce sufficient evidence of fraud and her motion was unsuccessful.  Id. at *6. 
 134. Frank, 833 A.2d at 195. 
 135. Id. at 197. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 198. 
 138. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2006) (providing that the court must evaluate 
the reasonable preference of a child if the court deems the child to be of sufficient 
age to express a preference). 
 139. A judge, of course, may interview children directly to ascertain their 
preferences and, as such, they can speak directly.  But for unrepresented children, 
even a relatively informal interview could be intimidating. 
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in the child’s best interests.  The risk here is that children’s voice 
will be muted, disregarded, or, perhaps, not even their own.  On 
the other hand, allowing children to have standing in proceedings 
affecting their fundamental interests would serve two purposes: it 
would grant a direct voice to developmentally capable children,140 
and it would advance an important societal interest in encouraging 
and enhancing children’s capacity for developing into autonomous 
citizens.141 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A purely autonomy-based theory of children’s rights seems 
inadequate in light of the way notions of children’s rights have 
developed historically and in the way the law has considered issues 
of standing in family law matters.  The traditional view of autonomy 
emphasizes negative freedoms, which seem inappropriate for 
children. 
How children’s rights should properly be conceived remains a 
work in progress.  It may be more productive to conceive of 
children’s rights as being inherent in children as persons and to 
ground children’s rights in dignity and protection rather than 
purely on the position that children are autonomous legal actors.  
At the same time, providing a system of graduated standing for 
children in certain family law cases may provide an opportunity to 
foster children’s development into autonomous citizens by allowing 
them a clearer and more direct voice in proceedings that directly 
affect their fundamental interests. 
 
 
                                                          
 140. See Woodhouse, supra note 5, at 119. 
 141. See id. at 118.  See also discussion supra Part III. 
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